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The beginning of the 21st century has witnessed important, perhaps epochal, 
developments in the organization of the monetary and exchange rate systems of the 
worlds economies. Perhaps most significant for the long run is the creation of the 
European monetary system, with its common currency, the Euro, at present shared 
by 12 of the 15 current members of the European Union. While there is little 
immediate prospect that any of the current hold-outs, the United Kingdom, 
Denmark, or Sweden, will join anytime soon, of equal consequence is the road to 
accession of the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union. While the first wave of new members, including the Republic of 
Slovakia, will accede to the EU next May, 2004, the road to joining the monetary 
union is longer and more arduous, and raises important and difficult questions 
relating to managing the transition, in the Slovak case for instance, from a managed 
floating exchange rate regime to the narrow fluctuation bands permitted under the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism II which Slovakia and the other new members will be 
expected to adhere to in the run up to eventual Euroization. Studying alternative 
exchange rate regimes, and determining the optimal choice of regime, including the 
transition between regimes, has never been more salient.1 
 
In this paper I do not profess to deal with the enormously difficult questions 
involved in navigating the transformation of the monetary and exchange rate system 
of, say, Slovakia as it proceeds on the ramp towards Euroization. But rather what I 
hope to do is to cast some light on the theoretical and conceptual questions involved, 
                                                
1 A useful survey is Fischer (2001). A brilliant recent survey and synthesis may be found in Dean 
(2003). 
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and to expose and articulate some of the principal arguments that have been put 
forward in the literature. Thus I see the objective as one of fixing our intuition, of 
building a sound analytical compass, before proceeding with the further arduous 
challenges of empirical investigation and policy analysis and formulation. At the 
very least if I am able to spark an interest in the highly interesting questions that I 
shall touch upon, amongst academics, students, and policy analysts in Slovakia and 
elsewhere, I shall consider the venture a success. 
 
To put it most simply, the age old question in international monetary economics that 
still animates much of the debate, is: Which is best, fixed or flexible exchange 
rates? As I have argued elsewhere, with Nicholas Rowe (Dehejia and Rowe, 2001), 
this is a bad question, because it is poorly formulated. Fixed exchange rate at least 
has the virtue that it is a well defined policy, that is, a monetary policy rule which 
ensures that the value of the nominal exchange rate remains pegged against some 
other currency at a particular level.2 But a flexible exchange rate is consistent 
with a huge variety of different monetary policies, some good, some bad.  An 
example of an obviously bad monetary policy consistent with flexible exchange rates 
is a policy of monetizing government budget deficits. Examples of sensible monetary 
policies include: monetary targeting (i.e., monetarism); price level targeting; 
inflation targeting; or a Taylor rule. But each operates very differently and will 
obviously have different macroeconomic effects.  Even fixed exchange rates come in 
different varieties. Does one fix to the US dollar, the Euro, another currency, or 
some basket? Does one use a fixed peg, a crawling peg, or a snake? Does one fix 
simply through a policy of the central bank, or is it supported through a currency 
board? Does one fix unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally? Or does one fully 
dollarize or Euroize? So the choice between fixed vs. flexible is not well 
defined. What one should compare is a fixed exchange rate of a specific type against 
a particular alternative, such as inflation targeting or monetary targeting. That is 
then a sensible question.3 
 
So, if we are to reformulate this old question in a way that is analytically more 
acceptable, we should ask: Which type of monetary/exchange rate policy is best 
amongst those available? While it may seem pedantic, and the phraseology is 
awkward, it is important to insist on referring to monetary/exchange rate policy, 
since, as we shall see, in a vast array of situations, monetary policy and exchange 
rate policy cannot sensibly be disentangled, so that it is misleading to refer to 
monetary policy without referring to exchange rate policy or vice versa. In a similar 
vein, the proper functioning of monetary/exchange rate policy depends as much 
upon the set of supporting institutions, legal and otherwise, and on the publics 
perceptions of central bank policy, as it does on the central banks actual policy 
                                                
2 Even this is not strictly true, as we shall see below. 
3 Although, interestingly, many undergraduate textbooks still formulate the question in the old, 
misleading way, and what they actually compare usually amounts to a fixed exchange rate vs. a fixed 
money supply. 
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rule. David Laider has referred to this construct as a monetary order, a turn of 
phrase that I find particularly felicitous.4 
 
Now if we look at monetary/exchange rate policies that are actually being advocated 
and seem like viable contenders, we see that quite a few of the policies that dominate 
discourse in the textbooks and scientific literature are in fact irrelevant. I have in 
mind in particular monetarism in its strict sense, that is, targeting the money 
supply, or more precisely one or a combination of particular monetary aggregates 
(or the rate of growth of such a monetary index). While popular in the 1970s and 
1980s, monetarism in this sense has now been abandoned by almost all central 
banks, and many of those which used to pursue monetary targeting now in fact 
pursue inflation targeting: Canada, my country of origin, being a case in point.5 
Likewise, and we shall return to this later, the use of a currency board to manage a 
fixed exchange rate system has been largely discredited, rightly or wrongly, by the 
fact that it evidently came a cropper in the case of Argentina. This relates to the 
hypothesis of the disappearing middle or hollowing out, which proposes that 
examples such as those of Argentina demonstrate that intermediate exchange rate 
regimes are highly unstable and prone to failure: and that, therefore, the choice has 
been polarized between a very hard fix on the one hand, preferably full dollarization 
or Euroization, or a fully flexible exchange rate regime, combined with a monetary 
policy such as inflation targeting, on the other. Indeed, there is some evidence of this 
phenomenon, with countries such as Ecuador and El Salvador adopting 
dollarization, joining Panama which has done so for many years, and countries such 
as Canada, Chile, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, etc., adopting more or 
less explicit inflation targeting. When one adds to this picture the economies of 
Eastern Europe who are on track for Euroization, or those which have already de 
facto Euroized, it does lend some credence, at least prima facie, to this hypothesis. 
 
Having thus framed the questions, I turn next to a discussion of what economic 
theory has to say on this question of fixed vs. flexible exchange rates, now 
understood in this reformulated sense. 
 
A central construct in this discussion is what has come to be called the 
incompatible trinity or the impossible trinity, which postulates that it is 
impossible simultaneously to achieve the following three goals: (i) maintain open 
capital markets; (ii) achieve a domestic target, such as controlling the price level or 
inflation rate; and (iii) achieve an external target, such as controlling the exchange 
rate. The argumentation behind this comes directly from the pathbreaking analysis 
of monetary/exchange rate policy in the short and long run, undertaken by Robert 
Mundell in the 1960s, which is one of the key contributions cited by the Nobel 
                                                
4 See, e.g., Laidler (1999). Although, as Robert Mundell has reminded me, this concept goes as far 
back as the 19th century and did not originate with Laider. He has, however, championed and 
popularized it in recent literature, so that it seems reasonable to attribute it to him in this more 
limited sense. 
5 Freedman (2003) has an excellent discussion of the history and relevant policy debates. 
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committee when it awarded him the Nobel Prize in 1999.6 This reveals immediately 
why it is necessary to refer to monetary/exchange rate policy: for, in a world of open 
capital markets, the two are necessarily intertwined. For instance, in a country such 
as Canada, which is committed to open capital markets and also to a policy of 
inflation targeting, the central bank must perforce accept fluctuations in the 
exchange rate, which it cannot control, as a necessary corollary. Or, on the flip side, 
a country with a fixed exchange rate, such as Austria during its long period of 
pegging to the Deutschemark, which was also integrated with the German (and 
world) capital market, had to accept fluctuations in its domestic inflation rate, over 
which it had no control, as a necessary corollary. To put it even more starkly, if a 
country is committed to open capital markets, it is illogical to discuss monetary 
policy and exchange rate policy separately: for it is possible to fix the exchange rate, 
or the price level, but not both. 
 
It should be noted that while the concept (albeit not the turn of phrase) of the 
impossible trinity is often attributed to Mundell,7 and would seem to flow naturally 
from his analysis, he himself repudiates this formulation, viewing the assumption of 
open capital markets as a red herring. As he prefers to put it, a central bank can 
either fix the quantity of money, and hence the price level (or, equivalently, fix the 
rate of money growth, and hence the inflation rate), in which case its price, i.e., the 
exchange rate, must be allowed to fluctuate: or it can fix the price of money, i.e., the 
exchange rate, and then must allow the quantity of money (or its growth rate) and 
hence the price level (or the inflation rate) to fluctuate.8 On this view, then, the 
presence or absence of open capital markets is irrelevant. While this formulation is 
extremely controversial, it is in fact not particularly important for current policy 
debates whether one uses the impossible trinity formulation or the Mundellian 
alternative, as none of the serious proposals currently debated advocate closing the 
capital market: so in either case the choice is between controlling the price level or 
the exchange rate. 
 
Having thus established that one must effectively choose between allowing monetary 
policy to pursue either a domestic or an external goal, or, loosely, choose between a 
flexible or a fixed exchange rate, we turn next to arguments that have been put 
forward on both sides of the divide. 
 
The classic argument in favour of flexible exchange rates is that due to the Nobel 
laureate Milton Friedman.9 His argument, sometimes called the insulation 
hypothesis, asserts that, by freeing monetary policy to pursue domestic policy goals, 
                                                
6 See Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences (1999), the background paper to the prize, also available 
on the Nobel website. 
7 Including by the Nobel committee in its background paper explaining the rationale for the award of 
the Nobel Prize, cited in the previous footnote. 
8 Mundell most recently put forward this view at the Western Washington University symposium at 
which an earlier version of this paper was presented, indeed in response to my discussion of the 
impossible trinity. 
9 The classic reference is Friedman (1956). A classic early empirical study, finding support for the 
insulation hypothesis, is Choudhri and Kochin (1980). 
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such as targeting the money supply or stabilizing the price level, a flexible exchange 
rate insulates or buffers the economy from external shocks, by allowing the 
nominal exchange rate to appreciate or depreciate as necessary and in accordance 
with market forces. When Friedman first expounded this, in the 1950s, the type of 
policy he evidently had in mind was monetarism, i.e., monetary targeting. 
 
As I have previously noted, that type of policy is now unfashionable, having been 
supplanted by inflation targeting as the flexible exchange rate policy of choice of 
central banks.10 In fact, it is relatively straightforward to recast the Friedman 
insulation hypothesis in the more modern garb of a comparison between a fixed 
exchange rate and inflation targeting: exactly this has been done by Nicholas Rowe 
and myself, in the context of a textbook Mundell-Fleming model, with the addition 
of a new Keynesian expectations-augmented supply curve, and, equally 
importantly, with the addition of a carefully articulated lag structure, which models 
the outside lag of monetary policy on the inflation rate (the monetary transmission 
mechanism), and the lag in nominal price adjustment by private agents (along the 
lines of, say, Fischer-type staggered contracts).11 We find in the model that price 
level (or inflation) targeting is the best policy, when compared to a fixed exchange 
rate, in the sense that it does best in minimizing the variance of output around its 
natural rate.12 Intuitively, targeting the price level (or the inflation rate), by 
validating expectations built into the supply curve (or Phillips curve if you prefer), 
eliminates undesirable deviations of the price level from its expected level, and 
hence, in expected value terms, keeps the economy at its natural rate of output.13 
 
As against this Friedman hypothesis, in its original or more modern versions, there 
is the equally classic concept of optimum currency areas, as propounded by 
Robert Mundell, another of the pathbreaking contributions for which he was 
awarded the Nobel Prize.14 Mundells argument is essentially that a flexible 
exchange rate can only do the job that Friedman and others suggest it can do, i.e., 
insulate the economy, if a currency area coincides with an economic region, that is a 
region within which factors of production are mobile but between which and the 
outside world they are not. To best see the intuition behind Mundells argument, 
consider, as he did himself, the case of North America, which consists of a political 
divide which is North-South, but an economic divide which is East-West. Thus, the 
United States and Canada are each currency areas, but they consist of two economic 
                                                
10 Freedman (2003) argues this is not merely a short term fad but instead a major policy shift. 
11 As an aside, we find it odd that several recent models of monetary policy make the assumption of 
no lags in the conduct of monetary policy, so that it is possible, indeed trivially easy, to conduct 
perfect monetary policy, a possibility only prevented by the assumption of random disturbances to 
monetary policy, which seems even more bizarre. 
12 Deviations in the natural rate of output due, say, to supply side shocks, are presumably efficient, 
and hence output should be allowed to adjust one for one to such shocks, unlike unforeseen shocks, 
such as demand shocks, whose effects should be minimized by policy. 
13 This statement of our results is a bit loose, as the paper further differentiates between price level 
and inflation targeting. For details, please see Dehejia and Rowe (2001). 
14 Mundells important writings on international economics in the 1960s are collected in Mundell 
(1968). A thorough and up-to-date treatment of the issues is in De Grauwe (2003). 
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regions which cut across this national divide. Suppose, for instance, there is a terms 
of trade shock favourable to manufacturing, located in the East, and detrimental to 
primary commodities, located in the West. In a world of sticky prices, this would 
cause an incipient boom in the East and an incipient recession in the West: but there 
is absolutely no way that an adjustment of the Canada  US exchange rate can 
insulate against this problem, because each country (currency area) contains two 
different economic regions that have been asymetrically affected by the shock. 
 
Flexible rates could only do the job, in such a case, if each country split into two 
currency areas, Western or Eastern, or better yet if the Western US and Canada 
had its own currency and the Eastern US and Canada another. But then to the 
extent that shocks are always to some extent asymmetric and idiosyncratic, by 
extension one could suggest that every province, or city, or even individual should 
have its own exchange rate! This obviously leads to a reductio ad absurdum, as the 
argument entirely misses, inter alia, the transactions costs of maintaining a separate 
exchange rate for smaller and smaller economic units. The upshot clearly is that the 
Friedman insulation argument, or indeed its modern counterparts, can only work 
perfectly for a country consisting of a single economic region, or a country in whose 
regions shocks are somehow always synchronized. Otherwise, any insulation that 
the flexible exchange rate may provide has to be weighed against the potentially 
destabilizing effects occurring at the regional level and which may be masked in the 
aggregate data. How important such asymmetric, regional shocks are, in practice, is, 
of course, an empirical question, and thus the limits of Samuelsonian, qualitative 
economics have evidently been circumscribed. It is worth noting that Mundells 
optimum currency areas concept does not, necessarily, argue in favour of a fixed as 
against a flexible exchange rate: it all depends on the situation at hand. For 
instance, in the Canada  US example, with two currencies intersecting two regions, 
it is an empirical question whether a flexible or fixed exchange rate does best for 
macroeconomic stabilization in either country. Likewise, it is an empirical question 
whether future entrants to the Eurozone will do better as a consequence,15 or, 
indeed, whether the current members have gained from membership.16 I shall 
return to this theme of the intrinsically second best nature of the problem at the end 
of this paper. 
 
But nonetheless several observations can still be made. The Friedman insulation 
argument obviously makes most sense for small countries that are heavily 
specialized on one type of economic activity: Norway, with is heavy reliance on oil, 
comes to mind. And, indeed, this is one of the considerations that weighs on the 
Norwegians in deciding to remain outside the European monetary union: since if 
they were to fix to the Euro, or indeed Euroize,17 the exchange rate could not adjust 
in response to shocks to the price of oil, which may have destabilizing effects on the 
economy. 
                                                
15 An excellent recent empirical analysis is Crespo-Cuaresma, Fidrmuc, and MacDonald (2003). 
16 The latter question is the subject of a special volume of Economic Policy, October 2003. 
17 Of course, to join the Eurozone formally, Norway would first need to join the European Union, of 
which it is not a member. 
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Secondly, fiscal federalism can mitigate, or at least ameliorate, the potentially 
destabilizing effects on various regions of a large federal state. Thus, in the example 
of Canada or the US, a terms of trade shock favourable to the East and detrimental 
to the West, could be partly offset by fiscal transfers from East to West. I shall 
return to this later as it helps to illuminate the important difference between Europe 
and the Americas. 
 
I turn next to another, more microeconomic, argument in favour of fixed exchange 
rates, which has been put forward, most recently and forcefully, in the case of 
Canada, by economists such as Richard Harris, Thomas Courchene, and Herbert 
Grubel.18 This can be called the transactions cost argument. It argues essentially 
that a fixed exchange rate, by eliminating uncertainty about exchange rate 
differentials, reduces transactions costs faced by firms engaging in international 
trade and foreign investment. Put another way, in the presence of a fluctuating 
exchange rate, firms need to hedge against the possibly damaging effects of 
unforeseen fluctuations in the exchange rate, by taking out forward foreign 
exchange contracts and the like: but this is costly and uses up real resources. On this 
view, fixing the exchange rate, and thereby eliminating this particular source of 
uncertainty, may serve to stimulate trade and investment, and hence the growth rate 
of output itself, to the extent that these are two of its chief engines. A further 
refinement of this argument, put forward by Herbert Grubel, argues that fixing the 
exchange rate, by reducing risk premia (which cause deviations between domestic 
and world interest rates via the modified uncovered interest parity relationship), 
can provide a further stimulus to investment and growth, by bringing domestic 
interest rates more in line with (presumably efficient) world interest rates.19 While 
the microeconomic foundation of the argument is theoretically sound,20 what 
remains highly contested is its empirical relevance. Despite a plethora of empirical 
analysis, including some highly noted work by Andrew Rose (e.g., Rose, 2000), it is 
fair to say that the jury is out on how important the transactions cost effect is in 
practice. 
 
Reference to the work of Harris, Courchene, and Grubel naturally gives rise to yet 
another argument, which is the comparison of a potential North American 
Monetary Union (NAMU) to the European monetary union of the Eurozone. Harris 
et al have argued that a NAMU is needed as a complement to the already existing 
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and they point to the European 
Union, which is both a customs union and a monetary union, as an exemplar. But 
the example of the EU is fraught and problematic as a point of reference for the 
Americas: in particular, it is obvious but essential to note that the EU is far more 
than a customs or monetary union, although those are two of its most important and 
                                                
18 See, e.g., Courchene and Harris (1999) and Grubel (2003). 
19 This additional refinement to the argument was put forward by Herbert Grubel during the 
Western Washington University symposium previously mentioned. 
20 Even this is not completely clear, as in certain models increased uncertainty can paradoxically 
raise the rate of return and hence be good for investment and growth. 
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visible components. Apart from these, it is as much, or even moreso, an exercise in 
political integration of the European continent, of which the economic elements are 
only a constituent part. Indeed, some of the staunchest advocates of European 
integration view the economic elements as merely a necessary and logical stepping 
stone to an eventual political unification of the continent. On this view, then, the 
merits of (say) the European common currency lie as much in its political impact as 
its its potential economic effects: or, to put it even more strongly, the truly 
committed Europhile would support the common currency even if it could be 
shown convincingly (which I hasten to add it has not) that is has proved 
economically harmful, in much the same way that no committed American patriot 
would support the breakup of the US dollar zone if it could be shown that it would 
be better to have (say) Western and Eastern US currencies. 
 
From this perspective, it is evident how huge is the gulf between the preconditions 
for politico-economic integration in Europe as against the Americas. Europe has in 
the European Union a set of transnational institutions that span economic, political, 
and judicial spheres amongst others, and include a common market, common 
currency, (arguably) a fledgling fiscal federalism, and (in the case of the Schengen 
countries, a subset of the EU) borderless travel. NAFTA, by contrast, is not even a 
customs union: its members maintain independent external tariffs, which necessitate 
the complex, non-transparent, and costly rules of origin required to prevent 
transshipping through the lowest tariff country. The NAFTA region in addition is 
characterized by countries of very widely differing income levels and institutional 
development, if one compares the US and Canada against Mexico, or other potential 
joiners in Latin America.21 All of this is merely to suggest that one must exercise 
great caution in looking to the EU as an exemplar for monetary integration, or 
indeed economic integration of any form, in the Americas or any other region of the 
world. 
 
I turn next from strictly economic, to what may be called political economy, 
arguments for and against fixing the exchange rate. The basic political economy 
argument, a version of which has been put forward by Mundell,22 runs as follows: 
In economies with poor monetary management, the outcome under flexible 
exchange rates may be much worse than under a credibly fixed exchange rate. Such 
poor outcomes can include disastrous situations such as hyperinflations. Consider 
the typical Latin American hyperinflation story. Governments need money, and can 
only raise it in three ways: raise taxes, issue debt, or print money. For a country in 
which no one particularly likes to pay taxes, and which is not creditworthy, 
seigniorage, that is, revenue from the inflation tax, is often the only substantial 
source of government revenue. But governments quickly reach the peak of the 
Laffer Curve of seigniorage revenue, and, as they slip past the peak, real revenue 
drops as money creation accelerates: the result is hyperinflation. This basic scenario 
fits (say) Bolivia as well as it does any other Latin American hyperinflation. 
                                                
21 It is certainly true that such gaps exist in the EU itself, but of not nearly comparable magnitude: 
the gulf between the richest and poorest EU state is a fraction of that between the US and Mexico. 
22 See Mundell (2002). 
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The argument then runs that, in such a country, fixing the exchange rate is a 
politico-economic mechanism for generating credibility and commitment to good 
monetary policy. This presupposes as well that fiscal policy is consistent with 
monetary policy, which can be equally problematic. But, if successful, and if the 
central bank can achieve a sufficient degree of autonomy so that it is not forced to 
monetize government deficits, fixing the exchange rate may be a route towards 
macroeconomic stability, as much for its political as its directly economic effects. 
Thus Panama, for instance, which has been dollarized for most of the 20th century, 
has had more or less the same inflation rate as the United States during the entire 
period:23 which gives it the best inflation record in the Americas, after the United 
States itself. 
 
But political economy arguments are not necessarily all in favour of a fixed 
exchange rate. It is worth noting the mere fact that, as Mundell puts it, All money 
is political.24 Fixing ones exchange rate is often perceived by the public as a loss of 
economic, and even of political, sovereignty. This is true a fortiori in the strongest 
form of a fixed exchange rate, currency adoption, e.g., dollarization, in which one 
gives up ones national currency and replaces it with the currency of the country 
one is fixing to. So, rather than a picture of Queen Elizabeth II on the currency (as 
in the Canadian $20 bill), there will be a picture of Andrew Jackson (as in the US 
$20 bill). How significant is this likely to be? Probably not very, as the European 
case proves: Italians, despite some pangs, were quite willing to give up portraits of 
Vincenzo Bellini and Maria Montessori for the greater stability of the Euro as 
compared to the lira. 
 
But there is a real issue here, of sovereignty and the related concept of 
accountability, that lies behind the political symbolism. If Canada, for example, 
were to adopt the US dollar, Canadian monetary policy, and the Canadian inflation 
rate, would effectively be set by the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, DC. 
Apart from any economic arguments for or against this situation, it grates against 
the instincts of a people inhabiting a system founded upon the accountability of 
elected officials in a democratic polity. It is true that the Governing Council of the 
Bank of Canada is not directly accountable to the Canadian people, but they are 
indirectly, through the government of the day, which exists due to a popular 
mandate. But the Canadian electorate does not, and could not, directly or indirectly, 
affect the policies of the Fed, which is in no way accountable to it. This is a point 
that has been stressed in some of the recent writings of David Laidler (e.g., Laidler, 
2002). It is applicable much more to the case of currency adoption than of currency 
union: because, in the latter case, each constituent of the union does have 
representation and there is accountability, albeit less than so in the case of a 
                                                
23 As a matter of economic theory, inflation rates can diverge between a country that fixes to another 
currency and the country it fixes to due to differences in the constituents of the basket used to 
construct the price index and the presence of nontraded goods. But, more or less, a country will get 
the inflation rate of the country it is fixing to. 
24 See Mundell (2002). 
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national currency. Thus, for instance, Italians do have a say in the functioning of the 
European Central Bank, through the Italian representation on its governing body: 
which Canada almost certainly will never have, on the Fed, if it unilaterally adopts 
the US dollar. 
 
I turn now from discussions of fixed vs. flexible exchange rates in general terms 
towards a more nuanced look at the advantages and disadvantages of specific 
varieties of fixing. Prior to the financial meltdown in Argentina, it had been thought 
that a currency board was a far superior mechanism for fixing the exchange rate 
than merely a peg by the central bank. A pegged exchange rate, particularly one 
which allowed for a fluctuation band, was prone to speculative attack, and 
consequent financial crisis, as evidenced by the breakdown of the original European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism in the early 1990s. By contrast, a currency board, with 
its more stringent constitutional status, and the fixed ratio of foreign currency 
reserves to domestic currency, was thought proof to such speculation. But as the 
case of Argentina in 2000 showed, a currency board system is still prone to a bank 
run, with the added dilemma of the loss of the lender of last resort function of the 
central bank. 
 
This particular argument, therefore, has lost much of its bite, with the 
disappearing middle hypothesis instead suggesting that true credibility and 
commitment can be bought only by a very hard fix such as currency adoption. 
Wholesale adoption of a foreign currency, such as the US dollar or Euro, is costly to 
implement and thereby automatically gains credibility: it is also costly to reverse, 
which generates commitment. But these very costs, which are possibly beneficial 
politically, pose potential economic problems. In particular, there is the seigniorage 
cost of currency adoption: it uses up real resources to replace the entire stock of 
domestic currency with the currency that one is adopting, and one foregoes any 
additional flow of seigniorage into the indefinite future  unless the country that one 
is fixing to is willing to share seigniorage, which the US Fed or European Central 
Bank are most unlikely to do vis-à-vis external unilateral adopters. This again 
reveals the superiority of a common currency over a currency adoption, as in the 
former case, such as with the European Central Bank, there is a mechanism for the 
distribution of seigniorage amongst members. While seigniorage may not be 
especially important for developed market economies, it remains so for many 
developing countries, and losing it poses a problem for the option of currency 
adoption. 
 
Reviewing the various arguments that I have examined in this paper, in what I hope 
is the most objective manner possible, attempting to avoid a bias in one direction or 
the other, the reader will have been struck by the evident lack of consensus in the 
theoretical literature. Is this simply because I have been insufficiently thorough in 
looking at all possible arguments, or insufficiently critical of one or the other set? 
This, of course, is possible, although I would like to think not, but I do not think can 
explain the lack of consensus. Rather I would like to suggest a much deeper reason 
for the lack of a ringing affirmation of one particular policy regime: that being the 
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intrinsically second best nature of the problem at hand. In a world with three big 
currency zones, the US dollar, the Euro, and the Japanese yen, if a country decides 
to fix against one, it will necessarily float against the others. This is true even if it 
decides to fix against a basket, as does, for example, Singapore, because no basket 
can eliminate the transmission of disturbances caused by fluctuations amongst the 
exchange rates of constituent elements of the basket. The policy choice involved for 
a country in such a situation is necessarily second best in nature, since no policy can 
eliminate all fluctuations mediated through exchange rates. As the celebrated 
theorem of the second best, promulgated by Richard Lipsey and the late Kelvin 
Lancaster, attests, there is no general presumption on the structure of the second 
best solution when the first best is, for whatever reason, unavailable. I should hasten 
to add that this second best theorem should not be (although it has often been by ill-
informed analysts) used as a bludgeon, silencing discourse and generating a 
nihilistic and pessimistic sense of the impossibility of qualitative economic 
statements. Rather, it should be an admonition to the careful empirical scrutiny and 
sound policy judgement that are necessary if one is to bridge the gap from 
theoretical possibility to real world relevance. 
 
In this vein, I would venture that the foregoing survey of the literature does suggest 
a few lessons which are likely to be second best proof. The first is that a common 
currency, for both economic and political reasons, is likely to work better than 
outright currency adoption: but some of its very advantages, such as the sharing of 
seigniorage and common control, make it difficult to realize in practice: the 
European monetary union being the signal exception to date. Second, for small 
countries, with histories of poor monetary management and which are heavily 
dependent on trade, investment, and tourism flows with another, larger country, 
and which may also be in the geopolitical orbit of that larger country, currency 
adoption may well be a sensible policy. Panama has done well by remaining 
dollarized, and its prospects are highly unlikely to improve, in fact they will very 
likely worsen, if the Panamanians decide to run their own monetary policy. The 
same is probably true for the other small Latin American countries that are 
dollarizing, and for the Caribbean countries, such as the Bahamas and Bermuda, 
which maintain strong pegs at parity against the US dollar, as well as for several of 
the smaller, macroeconomically weaker Eastern European economies which are not 
in the first wave acceding to the European Union, and which may well be better off 
by Euroizing anyway, and if necessary, unilaterally at some point. Finally, for 
larger, relatively diversified, developed market economies with a good inflation 
record and a recent history of sound monetary management, maintaining an 
independent monetary policy which pursues inflation targeting as the nominal 
anchor is likely to be the best amongst available options. This group of countries 
probably includes Canada, Australia, and Norway, and possibly the United 
Kingdom, but does not include the small economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
currently in the process of accession to the European Union. For these smaller 
economies, such as Slovakia, the salient policy challenge is how best to manage the 
transition to eventual, de jure Euroization, not on how to stay out. 
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Having looked at second best considerations and their practical policy relevance, I 
will perhaps surprise the reader by turning as I conclude to Utopian considerations: 
but then economists are often accused of this fault by our brethren social scientists. 
There are two very different, indeed polar, visions of monetary/exchange rate policy 
Utopia that I would like to leave you with. The first comes from the visionary 
Robert Mundell: A global economy requires a global currency.25 Unpacking all of 
the content of this lapidary expression would require a second essay. Suffice it to say 
that, on this Mundellian view, the creation of a global unit of account is necessary if 
the world is to enjoy the full fruits, and ameliorate the blights, of globalization, 
which would restore to the world the type of monetary order and high level of 
economic stability it enjoyed under the Bretton Woods system, or during the gold 
standard, or perhaps even, reaching back almost atavistically, to Roman times. 
 
The second, perhaps more prosaic but nonetheless potent, vision is that of a world of 
individual currencies, each pursuing its own monetary policy, such as inflation 
targeting, linked through a series of flexible exchange rates. On this view, it is such a 
global policy regime that will be most conducive to long run prosperity. While I am 
not aware that he has articulated the view in this way, I would attribute such a 
vision to, say, David Laidler, or, more hesitatingly, Stanley Fischer, who professes to 
eschew the grand or architectonic view of the international monetary system, but if 
pressed, might sign on to this rather than the other Utopia. 
 
I leave it to the reader to decide which vision he finds the more attractive. One thing 
is certain: the study of international monetary economics, and in particular the 
choice of an appropriate monetary/exchange rate regime, will remain a central 
fascination of economics for years to come. 
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